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ABSTRACT
In 2010, a paper entitled “From Obscurity to Prominence
in Minutes: Political Speech and Real-time search” [8] won
the Best Paper Prize of the Web Science 2010 Conference.
Among its findings were the discovery and documentation
of what was termed a “Twitter-bomb”, an organized effort
to spread misinformation about the democratic candidate
Martha Coakley through anonymous Twitter accounts. In
this paper, after summarizing the details of that event, we
outline the recipe of how social networks are used to spread
misinformation. One of the most important steps in such
a recipe is the “infiltration” of a community of users who
are already engaged in conversations about a topic, to use
them as organic spreaders of misinformation in their ex-
tended subnetworks. Then, we take this misinformation
spreading recipe and indicate how it was successfully used
to spread fake news during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elec-
tion. The main differences between the scenarios are the use
of Facebook instead of Twitter, and the respective motiva-
tions (in 2010: political influence; in 2016: financial benefit
through online advertising). After situating these events
in the broader context of exploiting the Web, we seize this
opportunity to address limitations of the reach of research
findings and to start a conversation about how communi-
ties of researchers can increase their impact on real-world
societal issues.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Anatomy of a political Twitter-Bomb
It was January 15, 2010, when a group of nine Twit-
ter accounts, all created within an interval of 15 minutes,
with names such as “CoakleyAgainstU”, “CoakleyCatholic”,
etc. These were accounts with names starting with the
Figure 1: The journalist John Carney (at that time
with CNBC), received one of these “reply-tweets”,
which he retweeted adding a comment expressing
his surprise, “<Wow! Political Tweetbots!–JC>”,
because this was an unknown phenomenon at that
time on Twitter. Carney deleted the URL of the
original tweet.
name of the democratic candidate Martha Coakley who was
running in the Special Election for the Massachusetts U.S.
Senate seat. The newly minted accounts sent 929 tweets
addressed to 573 unique users in the course of 138 min-
utes. All the tweets contained a URL to the same website
http://coakleysaidit.com, (also registered on January 15,
2010), that showed video and audio from a speech by Martha
Coakley, taken out of context, to advance the false claim that
she is against the employment of Catholics in the emergency
room.
The nine accounts were sending a tweet per minute and
repeating more or less the same content aˆA˘S¸ reasons to
be flagged as a spamming account. Twitter discovered the
automated tweets and consequently suspended all nine ac-
counts. Their existence and their misinformation attack
would have gone unnoticed had it not been for one fortunate
circumstance: we were collecting all tweets containing the
names aˆA˘IJcoakleyaˆA˘I˙ and aˆA˘IJbrown,” for Martha Coak-
ley and Scott Brown respectively who were the two candi-
dates for the senate election, in real-time during the week
leading to the election. But, the tweets sent by these anony-
mous accounts were not simple tweets, they were so-called
“reply tweets”, tweets directed to particular users. Why?
Because a new account on Twitter doesn’t have any follow-
ers. Tweets sent by such an account will not be read by
anyone. Thus, addressing the tweets to a particular user
makes it likely that the tweet will be read. But to what
user do you send the tweet, out of the millions that are on
Twitter? This is when a common spamming technique on
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Twitter comes in handy: reply to users who used certain
desired keywords in their tweets, that is, to users already
attuned to the topic. Our analysis of the recipients of these
“reply tweets” revealed that 96% of them had been tweeting
about the MA senate race in the four-hour interval between
the time the anonymous accounts were created and when
they started to send the “reply tweets”. Almost 25% of the
users who received a tweet (143 out of 573) retweeted the
message. A screenshot from one of the retweets is shown in
Figure 1. We chose to show this tweet, because the user is
a well known journalist1 and experienced user who joined
Twitter on March 2007. His surprise at the message indi-
cates the novelty of this technique at the time. The retweets
had the effect that the followers of the retweeters were likely
exposed to the misinformation, which they would have not
seen otherwise. This is because the messages didn’t include
hashtags, a common way to group together tweets about a
topic. Our estimation of the audience size, based on the fol-
lowers of the retweeters, amounted to 61,732 Twitter users.
1.2 A recipe for spreading misinformation on
Twitter
All the facts presented in the previous subsection were
part of [8]. What we didn’t do in that paper was to summa-
rize our findings in an easily memorable recipe, which con-
tains the steps used by the propagandists in spreading their
misinformation on Twitter. We’re providing this recipe for
the first time in this paper.
Step 1 Register a domain name for a new website,
for example: http://coakleysaidit.com
Step 2 Create anonymous accounts, for example:
CoakleySaidWhat, etc.
Step 3 Identify a community of users interested
in the topic, for example, the MA Senate
Election race.
Step 4 Target members of this community with
messages, for example, reply to users pro-
viding link to website.
Step 5 Wait for members of community to spread
message via retweets in their organic sub-
networks.
Table 1: A recipe for spreading misinformation on
Twitter via a “Twitter-Bomb”.
Our discovery attracted the attention of both journalists
and other researchers. A team at Indiana University, headed
by Fil Menczer, developed Truthy 2, a system that collects
Twitter data to analyze discourse in near real-time [13]. In
addition, our team at Wellesley developed Twitter Trails 3, a
system that can be used to monitor the spreading of rumors
on Twitter [7]. This focus on Twitter is justified by the fact
that it provides APIs for researchers to collect and analyze
its data, as well as the public nature of conversations on
Twitter. Both these features are missing on Facebook (not
entirely, but they are severely limited), thus, only Facebook
employees are able to study them. As evidence, see [2].
Meanwhile, researchers not affiliated with the company have
almost no opportunities to study information spreading on
1John Carney, https://twitter.com/carney.
2Truthy, now known as OSoMe, http://truthy.indiana.edu
3TwitterTrails.com, http://twittertrails.com
Facebook, especially that of rumors, hoaxes, and recently
fake news, a topic to which we turn our focus now.
The term “fake news” refers to lies presented as news, that
is, falsehoods online formatted and circulated in such a way
that a reader might mistake them for legitimate news arti-
cles. “Fake news” has been around since ancient times, but
information technology has made it possible to produce and
consume it on a massive scale. Such articles appear on a vari-
ety of little known websites, then turn a profit by competing
for clicks as advertisements on social media sites. In order to
be successful in attracting user attention, they present a fake
story of political nature, religious nature, or anything with
an emotional appeal. Typically, fake news stories, which
may or may not have some remote connection to reality, are
planted on social media sites using provocative titles and
images. “Click bait” attracts the attention of unsuspecting
social media users who click on links to these stories think-
ing they are visiting a legitimate news site. These engaged
users are drawn in by the emotional appeal, while fake news
providers get a share of advertising money from each click.
1.3 Spreading Fake News on Facebook
After the surprise results of the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election, the American media directed its ire at Facebook
and Google, as in this NY Times piece [20] written by the
Editorial Board, on November 19, 2016:
Most of the fake news stories are produced by
scammers looking to make a quick buck. The
vast majority of them take far-right positions.
But a big part of the responsibility for this scourge
rests with internet companies like Facebook and
Google, which have made it possible for fake news
to be shared nearly instantly with millions of
users and have been slow to block it from their
sites.
This criticism is only partly correct. Facebook had been
working toward fixing (or containing) the spread of hoaxes
on the site at least since January 2015, almost two years be-
fore the election [12]. They defined a hoax as a form of News
Feed spam report that includes scams (“Click here to win a
lifetime supply of coffee”), or deliberately false or mislead-
ing news stories (“Man sees dinosaur on hike in Utah”). As
we can notice from this definition, in 2015, the phrase “fake
news” wasn’t being applied yet to the kind of false stories
that flooded Facebook in the weeks before the election.
However, since it was difficult for independent researchers
to know the extent to which Facebook users were affected
by this issue, everything continued more or less as before,
and Facebook was alone in its fight. This changed in early
2016, when the online publication BuzzFeed took an interest
on Facebook’s unsuccessful efforts to deal with the problem.
In an article published in April 2016, BuzzFeed proclaims:
“it is the golden age of fake news” [5]. The article reveals
that BuzzFeed had conducted a study of fake news that was
spreading via nine known fake news sites such as the Na-
tional Report, Huzlers, or Empire News, using the services
of the company Crowdtangle, specialized in measuring so-
cial engagement. The findings revealed that while traffic
for these sites had gone down for a while during 2015, in
early 2016, it had started picking up again. The article also
interviewed Allen Montgomery – a fake identity for Jestin
Coler, the creator of a factory of fake news websites, as [19]
Figure 2: Screenshot from Google search results
about Martha Coakley on Jan 12, 2010. Notice in
highlighted red, the tweets attacking Coakley. This
was a finding from [8] on how Google was inadver-
tently giving premium space to political propagan-
dists, in an effort to have “fresh” and relevant search
results.
revealed after the election. Coler’s interview reveals some of
the tricks of the trade of fake news, and points out why he
believes he can win over Facebook:
Coler believes Facebook is fighting a losing
battle, doomed to fail no matter what it does.
“They can shut down National Report. Of course
they can do that,” he said. “But I could have 100
domains set up in a week, and are they going to
stop every one of those? Are they now going to
read content from every site and determine which
ones are true and which ones are selling you a lie?
I don’t see that happening. That’s not the way
that the Internet works.” [19]
Despite this sounding of alarm bells by BuzzFeed (as early
as April 2016), things got only worse with fake news on Face-
book. We counted at least 25 articles published on the topic
of fake news from April to November 2016 on BuzzFeed,
culminating with the story of “How teens in the Balkans
are duping Trump supporters with fake news”, published on
November 3, 2016 and followed up by the related piece on
“How Macedonian spammers are using Facebook groups to
feed you fake news”. These two articles provide details about
one of the fake news factories operated by young people in
the small town of Ceres, Macedonia, that targeted Facebook
users in the United States. After reading these news articles
Figure 3: Screenshot from Google search results
about Donald Trump on Jan 23, 2017. In addition to
the many sections to the page (such as the “featured
snippet” on the right column), notice how the tweets
shown above the fold belong to Trump himself.
(and others on the same topic), we noticed the clear similar-
ities to the process that lead to the Twitter-bomb against
Martha Coakley in 2010. In fact, we are able to map the
steps in the two recipes one to one, as shown in Table 2.
Step 1 Register web domains for lots of related
websites, with catchy names such as:
http://TrumpVision365.com, see [17].
Step 2 Create Facebook accounts of fictitious
people, e.g, Elena Nikolov or Antonio
Markoski, see [18].
Step 3 Identify and join a Facebook group about
a political candidate, e.g., “Hispanics for
Trump”or“San Diego Bernicrats”, see [18].
Step 4 Target members of the Facebook group
with posts, by linking to the fake news
website stories, see [18].
Step 5 Wait for members of the group to spread
the fake news in their organic subnetworks,
by sharing and liking it.
Table 2: The recipe for spreading “fake news” on
Facebook in the wake of the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election. It contains the same steps as the recipe
shown in Table 1.
This similarity should not be surprising. Once a spam-
ming technique has been proven successful, it is easily repli-
cated, since the knowledge about its working is also shared
on the Internet. What should surprise and worry us is the
fact that researchers and web platform developers may also
know about such techniques, but they do little to warn and
educate the public of the consequences. It is also unfortu-
nate that tech companies who have been used to facilitate
this practice, do not act pro-actively or effectively in stop-
ping it. As an example of ineffective action we refer to the
way Facebook handled the accusation that its news verifica-
tion was not balanced. We discuss it in a next section.
2. FROM PROPAGANDA TO FAKE NEWS
We should not give the reader the impression that on-
line propaganda started with Twitter-bombs or Facebook
fake news. In fact, it is much older than Social Media, it
is as old as the Web itself. However, before the develop-
ment of search engines it was not easy for propaganda to
discover you. Search engines made it easy for propagandists
to spread their message using techniques we now call Web
Spam [6]. Advertisers, political activists and religious zealots
of all kinds have been busy modifying the structure of the
Web in an effort to promote their own biased results over
the organic, unbiased results. The Search Engine Optimiza-
tion (SEO) industry has grown out of this effort, sometimes
using unethical techniques to promote their message, and
search engines have been continuously evolving to fend off
these attacks.
In much of the first decade of the new millennium, search
engines tried to defend against Web Spam, but the spam-
mers were successful in circumventing their defenses by using
first “Link Farms” and later “Mutual Admiration Societies”,
collections of web sites that would intentionally link to each
other in order to increase everyone’s PageRank [6]. Even
when Google was reportedly using up to 200 different sig-
nals to measure quality [14], professional SEOs would man-
age to get sites like JC Penney’s at the top of search results
[15]. Google’s ingenious solution to the problem of “unfair
competition for high placement on a page” was the introduc-
tion of the advertising model of AdWords and AdSense that
gave spammers an opportunity to make money while follow-
ing rules. That seemed to work for a while. However, these
financial incentives were so lucrative that they provided a
reason for anyone to have a presence on the Web, especially
if that Web presence managed to attract clicks and thus,
ad dollars. This led to “click bait” and to the creation of
ads masquerading as outrageous (fake) news stories, as we
discussed in the previous section.
But as Search Engines and Social Media evolve, so do the
propagandistic techniques. The rise of three recent methods
of spamming in the wake of the U.S. presidential elections,
“fake news”, “featured snippets”manipulation [4], and“auto-
completion revelations” [3] are the latest chapters in spread-
ing propaganda through search engines and social media so
that it will find you. As a community of researchers we need
to embrace the challenge of documenting and understand-
ing these phenomena as well as finding ways to make these
issues known to the platforms providers. Journalists and
non-specialists also need to be informed, as they sometimes
give credence to conspiracy theories, confusing the public
[21].
3. RESEARCH THAT INFORMS DESIGN
It is important for researchers, journalists and web users
to continue to pay attention to the information and misinfor-
mation they encounter on the Web, be it on Google, Twitter,
or Facebook. In this section, we discuss how research results
and their publicizing lead over time to changes in the design
features of these systems, addressing the exhibited weak-
nesses.
3.1 The Evolution of Real-Time Search Re-
sults
The central finding that gave the title to [8] was the ma-
nipulation of Google real-time search results through repe-
tition of Twitter posts by accounts (real users or bots) sup-
porting a particular candidate. In December 2009 (just one
month before the MA special election for the U.S. Senate
seat in 2010), Google followed Bing in introducing “real-
time search results”, placing social media messages in one of
the top positions search results for a relevant search query.
These messages came mostly from Twitter, which had an
easy-to-use API to pull the tweets. Tweets appearing in
the search results were those that had been recently posted.
That created the opportunity for political propagandists to
exploit the search rankings creating a Twitter-enabled Google
Bomb. As we documented in our paper, the manipulators
were repeating the same messages, something also allowed
by Twitter, over and over to increase the volume of conver-
sation about a particular topic and keep it fresh for search
engines to include in their real-time results. Repetition of
a message would be annoying to the propagandist followers,
but the target was not their followers’ feed; it was Google
and Bing, and through them, the public.
We can see these highly-placed tweet messages from ran-
dom Twitter accounts in a screen shot for Martha Coakley’s
search results, taken in January 2010 (Figure 2). During
2010, Google eventually recognized that giving anonymous
social media accounts a premium spot in its search results
was not in line with its goals for reliable information and for
a few years this feature disappeared. However, it has come
back again, but in a different format: when searching for a
person, it will pull up tweets from their timeline, as opposed
to tweets about them, as exemplified in Figure 3. This is
a great improvement, because it prevents actors who have
an interest to promote their adversarial messages about an
individual or product to receive an unearned spot at the top
of the search results.
3.2 The Evolution of Retweeting
In [8], we included the following observation at the end of
Section 4:
Our experiments with Google real-time search
have shown that, even though Google doesn’t dis-
play tweets from users that have a spammer sig-
nature, it does display tweets from non-suspected
users, even when these are retweets coming from
spammers. Thus, simply suspending spamming
attacks is not sufficient. There should be some
mechanism that allows for retroactively deleting
retweets of spam and some mechanism that la-
bels some Twitter users as enablers of spam.
At that time (in 2010), Twitter didn’t have an easy way
to quote a tweet and it allowed users to edit the original
tweet text when retweeting, as the tweet shown in Figure 1
indicated. That design feature turned out to be very prob-
lematic, among others for the reason mentioned in the quote
above: deleted spam tweets lived in the retweets of other
Twitter users. However, it was also problematic because
users often were purposefully changing the meaning of the
text they were retweeting [10]. Most of this re-purposing was
possible via third-party applications that were very popular
in the early years of Twitter. These applications were shut
down over the years and nowadays Twitter doesn’t allow the
editing of a tweet that is being retweeted. Additionally, if
the original is deleted, the retweet is also deleted, while in
a quoted retweet, the text “This tweet is unavailable.” will
Figure 4: Facebook recently moved into implement-
ing a system of warning towards sharing news items
that have been disputed.
show in place of the deleted tweet.
3.3 The Evolution of Fake News on Facebook
The proliferation of fake news on Facebook achieved new
levels once Facebook made a big change in how its algorithm
for the Trending News feature worked. Before August 2016,
when this change took effect, the Trending News feature was
being curated by human editors, who filtered out unreliable
sources and chose neutral or balanced sources for breaking
news stories. However, when the online tech blog Gizmodo
posted an article in May 2016 [11], in which former employ-
ees of the Trending News lamented anti-conservative bias,
Facebook reacted hastily and clumsily. Worried about po-
tential lawsuits for suppressing freedom of speech, it fired
its team of human editors and replaced them with Machine
Learning algorithms. Given their prior research on rumor
cascades on facebook [2] one would expect that technical
experts had a better understanding on the limitations of AI
algorithms, but maybe they were not involved in the deci-
sion [1]. It didn’t take long after that change for fake news to
start achieving Trending News status, as BuzzFeed reported
on August 30, 2016 [16]. Despite BuzzFeed’s relentless re-
porting on the fake news plague throughout the pre-election
season, the rest of the media and the public didn’t tune in
into this conversation until after the election.
Facebook initially disputed that it had a fake news prob-
lem, claiming that it accounts for only 1% of the news sto-
ries. However, the company changed course under the in-
creased and sustained public pressure and introduced new
features in its interface and the algorithms to address the
issue [9].
One important feature that has rolled out recently is the
labeling of news posts as“Disputed”via fact-checking, third-
party providers such as Snopes or PolitiFact. The screens
hot in Figure 4 is an example of this feature in action. In
addition to adding this label, Facebook warns users with an
alert box before they try to share a disputed story, but they
are still allowed to share [9].
It remains to be seen how this new feature will affect fake
news spreading. Again, access to Facebook data that could
allow independent researchers to evaluate the effectiveness
of such interventions. Without it, our understanding of
changes in human behavior correlated with or caused by
changes in the socio-technical platforms they inhabit, will
be limited. This is a reason of concern for our research com-
munities.
4. DISCUSSION
What is the moral of the story? In the past, researchers
were the ones discovering and documenting the misuse and
abuse of socio-technical platforms by the hands of dubious
actors with dubious agendas. [8] is only one such example.
However, our discovery was possible only because we were
collecting data in real-time, after having noticed some evi-
dence of foul play. When we think about Twitter’s approach
to combating spammers, it seems reasonable that tweets
created by misinformation-spreading accounts are automat-
ically deleted and retracted from the entire network, once
the accounts are suspended. However, the downside of such
an approach is that it makes it impossible for researchers
and fact-checkers to go back in time and study the origin of
misinformation campaigns and the mechanism for spreading
them. That is a severe limitation to research. The problem
becomes even more pronounced in the content of fake news
spreading on Facebook. Most Facebook groups are private
and if they are the source for starting certain cascades of
fake news, outside researchers cannot observe them in their
early stages, missing crucial information that would lead to
their understanding.
Thus, it is not surprising that in the current situation
created by the fake news plague, researchers didn’t play a
leading role in their discovery. It were journalists and not
researchers in academia or Facebook and Google who raised
concerns, but were not heard. This is worrisome. Facebook,
by replacing humans with algorithms, has played a crucial
role in fueling the fake news spreading phenomenon. Simi-
larly, the ease with which Google enables earning ad money
for page impression provided the financial incentives for the
creation of the fake news industry.
In light of what we know so far, here is our open ques-
tion to the research communities interested in information
retrieval:
in the context of the now omnipresent, web-based,
socio-technical systems such as Facebook, Google,
and Twitter, what tasks should be performed by
humans and what tasks by algorithms?
Our communities should lead the way in providing answers
to this question.
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